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Teleosemantics and the Believer
By Taylor Hamrick
I. Introduction

T

houghts seem to be about something – they seem to
have meaning. This property has been called
―intentionality‖. A theory of intentionality must explain how and why our thoughts have such content. A
naturalized theory of intentionality hopes to explain the
content of mental states within accepted scientific framework.
Such a theory of mental content hopes to explain the meanings of
mental states in non-intentional terms, avoiding words such as
believes or desires.
Teleosemantics
The focus in this paper will be one type of naturalized
theories: teleosemantic theories of mental content. Three types
of teleosemantic theories of content appear in the literature; I call
them the ‗High Level‘,1 ‗Low Level‘, and ‗All-Inclusive‘ theories,2
named for how they make content ascriptions. In the scope of
this paper, I will examine just one of those teleosemantic theories: the ‗Low Level‘ theory forwarded by Karen Neander.
Taylor Hamrick graduated in the spring of 2009 from the College
of Charleston. While there, Hamrick earned majors in Philosophy and (Pure) Mathematics. Since school, Hamrick has wanted
to open a brewery and has not ruled out the possibility of attending a graduate school. Besides the philosophy of mind, his other
philosophical interests include Pragmatism (à la Richard Rorty,
and Dan Dennett—but he calls it 'Instrumentalism') as well as the
philosophy of science. He stated that he could not provide a favorite philosophy quotation, because that sort of question would
entail a project in itself.
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Teleosemantic theories of mental content introduce the idea of
biological proper function in order to pinpoint mental content.3
Biological functions are behaviors of traits in the ancestors of an
organism that have led to the organism‘s survival. For example,
possible function ascriptions for the heart could be circulating
blood, creating rhythmic patterns of beating, or having four
chambers. Historically, it was the property of circulating blood
which led to the survival of those organisms that contained
hearts. If the heart circulated blood, but did not beat rhythmically or have four chambers, the heart would still have been selected for in the organisms containing them. Thus, the biological
proper function of the heart is pumping blood. Similarly, particular mental states have been selected for and we can move to
pinpoint the precise reason. Hence, we can examine biological
function when determining mental states‘ content.
If a state in a representational system is functioning
properly, then the content of that intentional state is what is supposed to be represented. And the function of any trait, including
mental states, is determined by natural selection. The story
about content in teleosemantics goes something like this: (i) A
token of a mental state is normally caused by an environmental
stimulus. (ii) The mental state acquires its content by allowing
the system to achieve normal functioning. (iii) Evolution determines the normal functional states of the system; hence we are
able to determine the content of mental states by reference to selection history.4 For example, a frog will snap at flies or BB gun
pellets when they pass in front of his visual field, but because
flies served as frog food in the selective history, the proper content ascription for the frog in the presence of either a fly or a BB
gun pellet will be (on one interpretation) the mental state with
content ‗fly‘. From this point on, I will use small caps—like
FLY—to indicate the content of a mental state.
Frogs have become a popular example in discussing
teleosemantic theories, so for the majority of this paper I will use
the example to discuss relevant issues. Simple organisms seem
to be the appropriate place to start when considering teleosemantic theories. In the same way that natural selection begins
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with simpler systems and has them adapt and become more
complex, mental states must at some point in selective history
have had much less sophisticated content and became more like
beliefs and other complex states as selective forces took their
course. If we begin to pinpoint determinate content in less sophisticated organisms, the more sophisticated contents will be
much easier to examine.
The Indeterminacy Problem
With appeal to natural selection, we are able to limit the
possibilities for mental content to those predicates which are
causally relevant to selection. But many of these descriptions
will co-vary in an organism‘s natural environment. Fodor points
out that, if the object of intentionality can reliably be picked out
by different predicates in an organism‘s environment, then any
of the descriptions are functionally equivalent as the organism‘s
mental content.5 In the frog‘s environment, small, dark, moving
objects are reliably flies which are reliably frog food. It appears
that we may be left with multiple predicates that are causally related to the trait‘s function. By considering selective history
alone, we cannot pinpoint the best or most appropriate content
from among the possible relevant descriptions. Ultimately, the
story for teleosemantic mental content can be told in many
ways—thanks to co-variation, a frog receives the same selective
advantage by sticking his tongue out at either FOOD, FLY, or
SMALL, DARK, MOVING OBJECT (there are teleosemantic theories
that argue for each). As Fodor puts it: ―Darwin cares how many
flies you eat, but not what description you eat them under.‖6
Thus, we have the indeterminacy problem for teleosemantics: many possible mental contents are extensionally equivalent, meaning that coextensive contents can be substituted for
each other without changing the success of the organism using
them. Selection history may be able to pinpoint only one object
towards which the mental state should be directed, but multiple
functional descriptions of that object exist. With reference to selection history alone, teleosemantic theories cannot know which
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of the descriptions will lead the system to proper functioning,
and this creates indeterminacy of content.7
In this paper, I will first discuss how a ‗Low Level‘ content ascription solves the indeterminacy problem. I will then
present a specific objection to the Low Level theory: that it does
not generalize to more sophisticated mental states. And in the
final section, I will defend the theory against the objection and
put forward a sketch of how to extend the Low Level teleosemantic theory.
II. The Low Level Theory
In this section, I will present a sketch of Neander‘s ‗Low
Level‘ teleosemantic theory of intentionality and explain how the
theory solves the Indeterminacy Problem.
Functional Decomposition
Neander borrows Robert Cummins notion of functional
analysis in her Low Level teleosemantic theory.8 In a functional
analysis, we first must decompose an organism or system into its
component devices and subsystems, each with a function that
contributes to the overall functioning of the system. Additionally, each subsystem can be assigned multiple functions. If a trait
T has a function F, then it will also have a function G if it is able
to G, in part, because it has the function of F-ing. This can also
be stated with ‗by‘ relations. We could say T has function G by
also having function F. In this way, we can decompose the function of a trait down to less and less sophisticated functional components. The decomposition seems to continue down to the subnuclear level. However, the level of description relevant to the
selection history of mental states will ‗bottom out‘ at a certain
level, namely, where the representational system is still unanalyzed, and any description below that will be a story about implementation.9 For instance, a frog‘s tongue snapping can be accounted for by neural firings or chemical reactions; however,
such explanations are not representational and thus, they cannot
help us to understand mental content.
Neander gives the example of an antelope with an adap-
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tation that leads to an altered hemoglobin structure.10 The antelope will have a greater level of fitness by avoiding predators that
hunt on the flat land by being able to live at a higher altitude by
increasing oxygen intake in the blood by having the altered hemoglobin structure. Each of the predicates linked with a ‗by‘ relation is a function of the antelope‘s hemoglobin structure, but
the trait itself is the most immediate explanation of the further
effects. It seems clear then that the levels of description in the
functional decomposition are not co-extensive. Escaping predators is not only accomplished by living at higher altitudes; living
at higher altitudes is not only accomplished by having a greater
oxygen intake, etc.
Looking at the highest level of function is often indeterminate, because there is conceivably more than one way of
‗climbing the ladder‘ to achieve the higher levels of function. In
the case of the antelope, we can think of many ways of increasing
fitness—an increased lung capacity, for instance, could result in
the same selective advantage given by the altered hemoglobin
structure. Since there is ultimately more than one possible way
to achieve some evolutionary results, the higher levels of function depend on the presence of the lower levels. Thus, the lowest
level of description that still contributes to the system‘s functioning is the most immediate in explaining the presence of the
higher levels: it is the most determinate explanation.11
Representational Content
In Neander‘s account, biological traits factor a great deal
into the content of representations. Organisms have evolved
with traits that have proper functions which were adaptive for
their survival. Systems have evolved with certain physical capacities and properties, and science studies these systems and
how they respond to stimuli in their environment. Since science
may describe the content of a representation or the function of a
trait in multiple ways for any representation or trait in question,
we must determine which of the biological devices and which
description of content is most immediate to how the representational system is able to achieve proper functioning.12
Neander claims that, at least in the case of a frog, the
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proper content ascription is at the level where the frog‘s detection device is unanalyzed in the decomposition.13 When considering the frog‘s representational system, the lowest unanalyzed
component of the functional analysis will be the detection device.14 The content of a representation is focused on the stimulusform that has been used by the biological devices. Note that we
are not concerned with neurophysiological behavior; we are not
concerned with how the representation is created or information
is processed, because only the features of the representation contribute to proper functioning. By focusing on the function of the
representation we can pinpoint the lowest level in the functional
decomposition as the most accurate description of what the biological device is doing. In frog-like systems, detection of properties of the perceptual stimulus provides content to the mental
state.
A frog tokens SMALL, DARK, MOVING OBJECT in the presence of flies or BBs moving across his visual field.15 In the environment where tongue snapping behaviors evolved, the small,
dark, moving spots were reliably flies, and flies are good frog
food. The frog displays biologically proper behavior by snapping at small, dark, moving objects. Higher-level descriptions
like FOOD or FLY are not the content. The frog snaps at any appropriately small, dark, and moving stimulus—this leads the frog to
snap at flies and BB gun pellets. It would be beneficial for the
frog to be able to detect nutritious objects or even to recognize
flies or other prey-species, but neither capability is part of the
naturally selected traits of the frog. The current representational
powers of the frog adequately approximate the appropriate nutritious or prey-like properties by detecting small, dark, moving
objects.16 Also, it is worth noting that SMALL, DARK, MOVING OBJECT is not referring to the image on the visual system, but to the
features of the flies and BB gun pellets that the frog responds to
in the environment. By appealing to the most immediate, lowest
-level description of representational content, we will point to
predicates that are causally relevant to the mental state‘s selection and are able to eliminate indeterminacy. That, in essence, is
the Low Level theory‘ explanation.
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III. Objections
Neander‘s Low Level teleosemantic theory brings about
three main objections: (i) Low Level theories do not pay enough
attention to the needs of the system; (ii) ascribing low-level mental content does not allow adequate room for misrepresentation;
and (iii) Neander‘s Low Level theory will not generalize to account for more sophisticated mental contents. For the remainder
of this paper, I will focus primarily on this third objection, because it seems to arise as a result of the first two.
Fails to Generalize
Neander concedes that her theory may have difficulty
when applied to human mental states for two main reasons: (i)
we can misrepresent without malfunction and (ii) the content of
mental states contains more information than features in the environment.17 Misrepresentation is unmistakably possible when
one considers belief-desire contents. Based on our intuition, a
frog is snapping at a fly because he wants to eat it. We know that
a small, dark, moving object may not always be something a frog
can eat—BBs are small, dark, and moving, but are not edible. But
the Low Level is willing to say that the frog has not misrepresented when it snaps at a BB. Misrepresentation in Neander‘s
theory occurs in those cases where something goes ‗wrong‘. For
instance, if the mental state or intentional behavior is not directed at an appropriately shaped target, then the organism has
misrepresented. Misrepresentation for the frog is a matter of his
failing to discern the properties of a stimulus. Again, the frog
does not misrepresent if he snaps at a bee-bee but would if he
snapped at a snail or a shadow moving across his retina.18 If we
compare frog representations to human representations, a generalized Low Level teleosemantic theory may be missing obvious
cases of misrepresentation. Suppose you see a garden hose at
night and believe that it is a snake because it shares certain
physical features in common. When you are startled by the
hose‘s presence, then certainly misrepresentation occurs. Perhaps if Neander claims that the frog has not misrepresented, then
she would also claim that you have not misrepresented when
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you are startled by the garden hose.
Contra Neander and the relevance of the frog example,
we know that our human representational states are not all a
matter of detection. When we discern the visible properties of an
object in the world, our representational work is not done. We
must put it to use, and this is where misrepresentation occurs.
Mohan Matthen has claimed that representations like the frog‘s
are only quasi-representational states because they do not carry
the type of information we expect in a representation.19 This
means that they do not closely resemble the full-blown representations we are used to employing, though beliefs and desires
may have evolved from these quasi-representational states.
Elsewhere, David Papineau claims that there may not
even be a determinate answer about the content of the frog‘s
mental state, suggesting that using our understanding of frog
mental states to understand belief-desire states will be even more
difficult.20 The failure to generalize may be an objection to teleosemantic theories in general, due to their focus on simple representational systems. Because we, as humans, can only be sure
that systems with belief-desire psychology have determinate
mental content, we cannot have determinate content in systems
without beliefs and desires. Thus, our understanding of simple
representational states does not help in understanding more sophisticated states. Low Level teleosemantics does not tell us anything about human beliefs and desires.
IV. Extending the Low Level
In this section, bearing in mind those strong complaints, I
will present a brief sketch for how Neander‘s teleosemantic theory (or perhaps a modified version) can apply to more sophisticated representational systems, such as those with a belief-desire
psychology. First, I will dismiss the mistaken intuition that frogrepresentations should resemble our belief-desire representations. Then, I will introduce a few tools, strategies, and considerations that may help in conceiving of how the story may generalize.
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Action-Oriented Representation
Action-oriented representations 21 (also called pushmipullyu representations22) carry information about the world and
an appropriate course of action. The representation is immediately linked to behavior, as opposed to a more intuitive notion of
representation, where an internal, behavior-guiding representation (like a desire) is paired with a detecting or indicating representation (like a belief) to produce behavior. An action-oriented
representation does not require inferences, and the functional
behavior is immediate to the detection of a stimulus. These are
primitive representations, used to reduce the information processing used in achieving proper function.
The frog‘s mental state in the presence of flies seems to be
one of these pushmi-pullyu representations. The frog does not
have to first identify an object in his environment, and then decide whether to snap at it. The tongue snap immediately results
from the detection; it is built into the state SMALL, DARK, MOVING
OBJECT. Also, the representation is well-defined for the frog. Because the representation and subsequent tongue snapping is only
concerned with the stimulus-form, the gathering behavior will
occur when the frog detects the proper object. If a frog snap was
directed at FOOD, then he ought to not only snap at flies, but also
at any object that will be nutritious. A frog does not detect food
because he does not use that representation to snap at other
small insects that populate his environment. Also, FLY does not
describe the frog‘s mental state, because some flies, e.g. dead
ones, may not cause tongue snapping. The frog will only snap
upon detecting certain properties of the stimulus – namely, that
it is small, dark, and moving. Thus the correct content ascription
is SMALL, DARK, MOVING OBJECT. The mental state the frog is using to obtain flies is of this primitive type – it is action-oriented,
and our intuitions about beliefs and desires do not apply to this
class of mental states.
Properties of Action-Independent Representations
Opposed to these action-oriented representations, there is
another class of representations that are action-independent, and
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beliefs and desires are types of these action-independent mental
states. Andy Clark divides in two the cases where a representation is available in the absence of an environmental stimulus.
The first, and simpler, case involves ―reasoning about absent,
nonexistent, or counterfactual states of affairs.‖23 These mental
states are able to direct behavior in the absence of their object by
allowing the user to remember past conclusions and predict future outcomes. This means that representations of previously
detected stimuli can be available to the system independent of
behavior. For example, we could token the representation FLY in
planning a picnic in order to remember to bring bug spray,
whereas the frog will snap immediately upon tokening SMALL,
DARK, MOVING OBJECT and is not able to use the representation
without the presence of a stimulus.
The second form of action-independent representations
are those mental states whose ―physical manifestations are complex and unruly.‖24 These representations point to sets of predicates which are related in a more abstract manner, and many
times, these representations are concerned with classifying an
object in a particular way in order to guide behavior toward it.
These mental states can be available in the absence of environmental stimuli, but the stimuli that they point to are less clearly
defined. An example of such a representation would be LARGE,
and with it we would be able to distinguish between two objects
that may be very similar, namely by choosing which is larger.
And we can additionally use the representation LARGE to make
comparisons between two objects which may be different, if they
happen to have largeness in common. Again, action-oriented
representations do not have this property—the frog cannot
choose which of the two objects is more small, dark, and moving;
he simply snaps in the presence of those features alone.
Additionally, it seems that these sorts of sophisticated
representations can be applied to an indefinite number of situations. By possessing a mental state directed towards a concept,
we must also possess the general knowledge of how and when to
apply the concept to various objects. This is the Generality Constraint for conceptual representations.25 Our understanding of a
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concept or a conceptual property seems to imply two abilities.
For any object R, we can entertain the mental state that R has
property P, as long as we possess the concept of P. And additionally, if we possess the concept of a property P, then we can
apply P to any object capable of possessing P. For example, if we
possess the state CAT, then we can entertain the mental state OLD
CAT or CIGAR-SMOKING CAT so long as we have the concept OLD
or CIGAR-SMOKING. And similarly, if we possess the concept
VALUABLE, we can entertain the internal state VALUABLE HOUSE or
VALUABLE TREE, as long as houses or trees can be valuable. However, the frog does not possess the concept SMALL or DARK or MOVING—those contents are only properties of the intentional object
at which he is snapping.
If we are to scale the Low Level teleosemantic theory up
to account for action-independent states, then we must be able to
tell a story about how these properties of representations will
arise. Detection of present environmental features seems to be
all that is necessary for action-oriented representations. But this
does not hurt the theory. Think again of the frog. Perhaps it
would have been able to acquire an independent mental state FLY
had its environment been filled with BBs. It would still be detecting small, dark, moving things, but the detection of some additional feature would be necessary to ensure fitness, and the
causal interaction of these two features (assuming that the frog
has to infer from two distinct detections that his desired snapobject is present, instead of combining the information into one
detection that is action-oriented) would lead to a rudimentary
representation pointing to flies. Now it seems now that a viable
possibility for obtaining action-independent representations
must include the interaction between multiple representations in
one mental state.
The Representation Toy26
Here, I will ask you to conceive of a certain type of representational system, slightly more complex than the frog‘s, but
still very simple. I hope to illustrate how ascribing low level content to a system with multiple representations depends on causal
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interaction. For these illustrations, I will use the letter S to represent stimulus, R for representation, and B to indicate behavior.
The simplest system will have two detection-type representations that must combine to guide behavior. Thus, there will be
four possible behaviors depending on whether either of the two
representations is tokened. For any number of representations
N, they will combine to cause 2N outcomes, some of which may
be behavioral and others representational:
¬R2 R2
¬R
1

B1

B2

R1

B3

B4

Figure 1: Representation Toy with two representations.
When ascribing the mental content behind any of the behaviors
involved, we cannot describe the mental state as detecting just
one of the two features, because this will not account for the
presence or absence of the other representation. Instead, content
must be assigned for any particular behavior according to how
the two representations, R1 and R2 interact. If the representational system is only action-oriented, at the very least we will
simply have a combination of two detections. But if our system
possesses the capability of inference, then it will be able to entertain concepts that rely on the interaction of both detections. It
appears, then, that possessing action-independent representations relies on increasing the causal complexity of the system and
the number of interactions between representations.
Consider yet another scaling up of the system. In this
toy, there are again two simple detection representations, R1 and
R2, which are caused by environmental stimuli S1 and S2. But
there is a third representation, R3, which is a directive representation that will be caused to token by the detection of R1. The
presence of this representation will ultimately guide certain be-
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haviors—in this case either B1 or B2 will occur without the presence of the detection representation R1:

R1&R2

R1&¬R2 ¬R1&R2 ¬R1&¬R2

¬R3

R3

R3

B3

B4

R3

B2

B2

B2

B1

Figure 2: Representation Toy with one action-independent representation.
In this representation toy, the output is not all behavioral. When
analyzing the functional behavior, the mental state clearly is not
a matter of detection alone. The representational system must
use an independent behavior-guiding representation caused by a
prior detection event. This notion is comparable to the detection
of hunger and the independent desire to eat. So, when ascribing
content to the mental state, we must consider a representational
system which does more than detect.
This brings us to how the Low Level teleosemantic theory
of mental content could assign a meaning to action-independent
mental states. Our hope in examining the first representational
toy was to find a low-level content ascription that will not rely on
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detection only. When analyzing the representational system capable of inference, the functional decomposition contained more
than the detection device—which would have been incapable of
performing inferences on its own. Now, with this second example of a representational toy, we certainly have some actionindependent states as opposed to a system only possessing action-oriented states. When we are examining a representation
that can be present in a system without a detection event causing
it, the lowest level in the functional decomposition must exist
within a system that does more than detect. The detection device
alone will not account for our representation‘s content. If it is to
successfully guide behavior, the system that this representation
belongs to must have some conceptual or inferential capabilities.
While it may not have mental states like ―I believe there is an S2
nearby…‖ or ―If only I had some S2…,‖ the system at minimum
must have a conception of the object S2 or representation R2
(which represents S2) independent of its detection in virtue of
how R3 is able to direct behavior towards S2 and R2.
The properties of action-independent representations discussed earlier are easily comprehended in our three representation toy (the second one); but if we were to imagine
further scaling-up of the toy, the representations involved would
become more complex and abstract, because of the increasing
number of interactions. As the complexity continues to increase,
our system would have to be able to compare representations
that are seemingly unrelated. Yet, even once we have these complicated types of action-independent representation available, it
still seems that our low-level content would conform to the generality constraint. Our three-representation toy does not have
adequate conceptual content to use its representation R3 in any
other capacity than directing his behavior towards the object S2.
But nonetheless, the frog can apply a property like ―R3 satisfier‖
to any object that causes R2—namely, S2-type objects. And as
we continue to scale up, there will be multiple non-detection, action-independent representations available to the system which
get their content by virtue of how they are related to the other
behaviors and representations of the system. Thus, the toy will
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be able to apply those representations as properties of the various objects and concepts towards which those representations
can be directed.
V. Conclusion
Now that our representational system can have actionindependent representations with content ascribed by the Low
Level teleosemantic theory, we can see why the frog‘s misrepresentation occurred. In addition, we still retain the case of a malfunctioning neural apparatus causing misrepresentation—for
example, if our three-representation toy was to token the state R2
when no S2-type object was present. But with the mental state
R3, it is clear that mistakes in reasoning about representations
can occur—these are cases of what I will call ―inferential misrepresentation.‖ First, if R2 was mistakenly tokened, as above, then
the inferential system will of course make the mistake of guiding
behavior towards objects which will not satisfy R3. This is the
easy type of inferential misrepresentation, similar to mistaking a
garden hose for a snake, where snake-directed behavior would
most likely be misguided. The correct inference will be made by
the representational system, but the mistake will have occurred
in detecting the information used in the inferential process. Additionally, the possession of these behavior-guiding representations could cause a different type of inferential misrepresentation. The representation toy might use R3 to cause R2-directed
behavior without the presence of either R2 in the system or S2 in
the environment. This would be comparable to going to the refrigerator to get a glass of milk when you do not believe that
milk is in the refrigerator. R3 will direct itself towards R2 in R2‘s
absence, without the other representations it relies on to enact
mistake-free behavior. Thus, low-level mental content ascriptions are still compatible with misrepresentation as a mental
state‘s causal complexity is increased.
In the case of the frog, we had to find the function of the
detection device to determine content, but with action independent states, we must give preference to the lowest level
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where the representational system as a whole is functionally
complete. The most immediate effect of a mental state on a representational system will include all of its interactions —
including possible interactions with the other states of the system. Of course, I have not explained the story entirely. It remains to be seen how we determine a complete description of
what the most immediate effect on the system is. Choosing exactly which devices contribute to the representational system in
our analysis may also be difficult. The important fact for Low
Level teleosemantic theories is that it seems that such a story can
possibly be told. And the appeal of low-level ascriptions of content remains by picking out the meaning of a mental state in the
least sophisticated manner, despite the increasing complexity of
the story told.
In this paper, I set out to examine the Low Level teleosemantic theory of intentionality. First, I presented the basic theory, and an objection to the project – Fodor‘s indeterminacy
problem. I then presented Neander‘s Low Level solution to the
indeterminacy problem. I offered a close look at one objection
against the Low Level teleosemantic theory: that the theory fails
to generalize to more sophisticated, action-independent representations. I reframed the frog‘s mental state as an actionoriented representation, showing that the frog‘s mental state in
the presence of flies was really a matter of detection, in order to
dismiss mistaken intuitions about the Low Level content. Finally, I presented some concerns and considerations regarding
scaling up the Low Level theory to account for human representation. Ultimately, I‘ve concluded that the Low Level teleosemantic theory is a viable option for explaining intentionality.
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Notes
1. see Ruth Millikan, ―Biosemantics,‖ The Journal of Philosophy 86
(6) (1989); Carolyn Price, ―Determinate Functions,‖ Noûs 32(1)
(1998); Justine Kingsbury, ―A Proper Understanding of Millikan,‖ Acta Analytica 21(3) (2006)
2. see Nicholas Agar, ―What Do Frogs Really Believe?‖ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71(1) (1993);
3.David Papineau, ―Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy,‖ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76(1) (1998); Karen Neander,
―Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning,‖ Philosophical Studies 79(2)
(1995); Ruth Millikan (1989); Carolyn Price (1998)
4. Jerry Fodor, A Theory of Content, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1990); David Papineau (1998)
5. Jerry Fodor (1990)
6. Ibid., 73
7. Fodor (1992) claims that the only way to select between reliably equivalent ascriptions of content is to use counterfactuals.
Additionally, he claims that teleosemantics cannot appeal to
counterfactual situations because an organism‘s fitness is not determined by possible events but actual events. Examining selection
history will only reveal what has been selected, not what would
be selected for if the environmental conditions were varied.
However, the proponents of teleosemantic theories often freely
appeal to counterfactual situations without consideration of this
objection. One possible argument for the use of counterfactuals
was forwarded by Neander (1995). Because history is filled with
causal interactions, and causal interactions rely on counterfactual
statements, we can look back into history and consider what
would have occurred if the forces of selection had varied. Ultimately, Fodor can only exclude certain counterfactuals, but as
long as they are causally relevant to selection, we can consider
them in determining teleosemantic content.
8. Robert Cummins, ―Functional Analysis,‖ The Journal of Philosophy 72(20) (1975)
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9. Cummins (1975) does not appeal to teleofunction or natural
selection in his explication in functional analysis, but Neander
(1995) uses the teleological notion of biological function because
it brings us to a level that is useful to the systems within the organism.
10. Karen Neander, ―Content for Cognitive Science,‖ in Teleosemantics, edited by G. MacDonald and D. Papineau 167-194. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006)
11. Karen Neander (1995)
12. Karen Neander (2006)
13. Karen Neander (1995), 130
14. It may seem that all representation is not a matter of detection. I will discuss this objection later in the paper.
15. SMALL, DARK, MOVING OBJECT is not necessarily the complete
description of the intentional object, it is shorthand means of describing the object, just like FOOD does not describe all of the
properties that make something nutritious—but it is a manner of
summarizing those properties quickly.
16. Karen Neander (2006) p. 185
17. Karen Neander (1995) p. 132
18. Ibid.
19. Mohan Matthen, ―Teleosemantics and the Consumer‖, in
Teleosemantics, edited by G. MacDonald and D. Papineau 146-166
(New York: Oxford University Press 2006)
20. David Papineau (1998)
21. Andy Clark, Being There, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997)
22.Ruth Millikan, ―Pushmi-Pullyu Representations,‖ Philosophical
Perspectives 9 (1995)
23. Andy Clark (1997), p. 167
24. Andy Clark (1997), p. 167
25. Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, (New York: Oxford
University Press 1982)
26. I would like to thank my advisor Whit Schonbein for the idea
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